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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
CURTIS LE\VIS,
-vs-

Plaintiff,

CLYDE L. WILLARD, dba
'VILLARD CONVALESCENT
HOl\;IE,
Defendant.

Case No.
12622

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF CASE
This is an action brought by Curtis Lewis, plaintiff above named, claiming damages for the negligence
af the defendant for failure of the defendant to discharge its duty to care for plaintiff, a patient in a convalescent home of the defendant.
DISPOSITION IN LOvVER COURT
Judgment was entered by a verdict of the regularly
empaneled jury in favor of the defendant, Clyde R.
'Villard, dba Willard Convalescent Home, and against
the plaintiff, Curtis Lewis, no cause of action.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks an order remanding the case to the
trial court for a new trial.
STATEl\iENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff, Curtis Lewis, lost his right leg through
amputation in 1965. In 1966; he had his left leg amputated in the San Juan County Hospital, l\Ionticello.
Utah, by Dr. C. D. Goon, (Tr-199). Dne to complications, a second amputation was required on the left leg.
Plaintiff remained in the l\Ionticello I-Iospital for 25
days and reported that the left leg was practically
healed up and the stitches had been removed when he
left. (Tr-192) Plaintiff was transferred from the San
Juan Co. Hospital to the 'Villard Convalescent Home
on September 24, 1966, '"·hereupon Dr. Charles Smith
examined plaintiff about two weeks after his arrival.
( Tr-195)
After being examined by Dr. Smith plaintiff re·
mained in bed at the vVillard Convalescent Home and
about a month after he had been there developed bed
sores on both sides of his posterior and on his back. (Tr·
197) Sometime later, he developed infection in his stump
and the infection continued to worsen. The bandages
were infrequently changed and when they were changed
the changes were made by Gene vVillard who is not a
nurse. (R-194) No doctor was called to see him until
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.Tnn1rnry 2!J, l!Hl, although he had requested a doctor
mam·
. ti1:1es. (Tr-ZOO) ( Tr-47) Plaintiff was on \velfare
from San .Juan County and he was told that he wouldn't
he taken to l' tab Yalley Ilospital to sew up his gapping
.,tu1r,p because "they ('Villard) was afraid of the
money''. (Tr-197) Plaintiff's bed became wet with a
solution which was squirted on his stump which he claims
aggra ,.ate J his bed sores. ( Tr-198) At that time Dr. J.
\V. _\ix on came in and as soon as he saw plaintiff
recommended that he be transferred to the Eldred Hospital. ( Tr-44 to 47)
'

Plain tiff's condition upon being admitted to Elclrc<l Conntles('.ent Jiome was described by the nurse,
.2'i Jirty. requiring ten basins of water to clean him up.
( Tr-82) X urse Simmons te5tified that his stump had a
buue protruding through a large excoriated area of
flesh with purulent drainage and that "it wasn't
<t tJretty sight. It's enough to turn a good old hard
nurse's stomach upside down." ( Tr-84) Jessie I-Iawk,
pbintiff's social worker, described the leg as a "raw
stump that looked like a piece of meat that was rotten,
with a bone about the size of my fist hanging out of
it." (Tr-7<>)
Plaintiff's stump eventually healed under treatu1cn t <<t the Eldred Cmwalescent Home and he was dis( Tr-208) 'I'rial in the above matter was held
the I-Ionorable George E. Ilaliff sitting with a
.]m·y on the I Hth. 17th. 18th, and 21st days of June,

4

1971. (Tr-1) Plaintiff claimed negligence on the part
of the Willard Convalescent Home and sought to recover damages for that negligence alleging as specific
acts of negligence the following:
" ( 1) Failure to turn the plaintiff in bed regularly, and failure to turn the plaintiff at all.
( 2) Failure to provide plaintiff with a vibrating bed or sheep skin or other protective device
to prevent bed sores. ( 3) Failure to provide a
doctor, and failure to provide proper medication. ( 4) Failure to keep the plaintiff clean,
and failure to keep the plaintiff's bed dry.
(5) Failure to properly dress and care for
plaintiff's wound." ( R-84)
Plaintiff claimed that the expenses of the Eldred
Convalescent Home were special damage to him and
that he was entitled to general damages for pain and
suffering.
Plaintiff made objections to the courts instructions
( Tr-484) and made a motion for a new trial based
thereon. ( Tr-118)

POINT I. TI-IE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 15 TO TIIE JURY
ON CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
Instruction 15 (R-106) states:
Before contributory negligence would preclude
plaintiff's recovery, you must find from a preponder·
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anee of the evidence that each of the two foil owing
propositions are true:
PROPOSITION NO. I:
That plaintiff was negligent in one or more of
the following particulars:
(a) Plaintiff failed to heed medical advice in continuing to smoke cigarettes and
<lrink coffee after being warned of the effect
that coffee and cigarettes had on the circulatory disease of which he was afflicted.
(b) That plaintiff failed to lie on his
side for periodic intervals after being warned
of the consequences of lying in one position on
his back for extended periods of time.
PROPOSITION NO. 2:
That the said negligence of the plaintiff, if
any, was a proximate and contributing cause
of the injury. If you find those two propositions against the plaintiff, he cannot recover
even though you found in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant on the issue
stated in preceding instruction.
The normal reading of the instruction can be interprete<l as follows: If you find that plaintiff continued to smoke an<l drink coffee and if smoking cigarettes :incl <lrinking coffee contributed to his injuries
you must bar the plaintiff from recovery or, if you
t'iu<l that plaintiff failed, to Jie on his side and this
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contributed to his injuries you must bar the plaintiff
from recovery. The bar to recovery covers all plaintiff's injuries.
This reading requires a verdict against plaintiff
even though the acts named by the judge were not the
proximate cause of the injury. Smoking and drinking
coffee may have contributed to the initial amputation
but there was no testimony that it would cause infection
in his stump.
The effect of the above instruction is to direct a
verdict for defendant who has an absolute defense regardless of any of its acts because plaintiff continued
to smoke and drink coffee. The jury had to only find
( 1) that plaintiff continued to drink coffee or smoke
or ( 2) that plaintiff failed to lie on his side to be barred
from recovery. The jury was not required to find that
plaintiff did both parts of proposition one. Thus, if
plaintiff failed to lie on his side he is barred from recovery for acts of negligence on the part of Willard
Convalescent Home in caring for plaintiff's infected
stump. Likewise, if plaintiff continued to smoke or
drink coffee he is precluded from recovery for acts of
negligence on the part of Willard Convalescent Home
in regard to plaintiff's bed sores.
A proper instruction would have had the jury consider the fact that plaintiff continued to smoke and
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drink coffee as an element of negligence or in mitigation
of damages. But here the Court has determined what
specific acts are contributory negligence which will bar
the plaintiff from recovery.
The only evidence of medical advice being given to
plaintiff was allegedly found in Dr. Goon's medical
report and reported second hand by Dr. Nixon. This
hearsay evidence assumes that plaintiff was told that
he should stop smoking and drinking coffee. There is
no mention in Dr. Goon's report (Ex I) to indicate
that he ad,rised plaintiff to stop drinking coffee and
smoking cigarettes. There is no chance to examine Dr.
Goon as to why he wrote, "Ilis cooperation was not good
in that he refused to decrease his smoking and ingested
large amounts of coffee'', (Ex I) or what the result
of failure to stop smoking and drinking coffee would
be. Certainly many people are warned to stop smoking,
stop drinking coffee, stop gaining weight, stop eating
foods with cholesteral, etc., which is good medical advice hut which would not be given as an ultin1atum which
would bar recovery.
The testimony on medical advice is as fallows:
Q. (By l\1r. I vie) Now, the record shows,
does it not, that this man Curtis Lewis had been
ad vised to discontinue the use of cigarette
smoking?
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A. (Dr. Nixon) Yes, He knew this.
Dr. Clark called by Defendant, was asked.
Q. (By l\ir. Ivie) Doctor, I now draw your
attention to Dr. Goon's "POGRESS RECORD," which consist of three pages, and ask
you to assume that the information therein contained is accurate. Based upon the progress
records, and that is the report I am asking you
to look at there, Doctor, do you have an opinion, based upon a reasonable medical certainty,
assuming an uncomplicated recovery, and assuming further that Curtis Lewis used cigarettes, as to what period it would require him
to have the stump heal'? Do you have such an
opinion?
A. (By Dr. Clark) I couldn't put it within
a period of three years, or whether it would
ever heal or not.
Looking at what has happened to this
man, and assuming that he went on smoking
large numbers of cigarettes, which he was doing at this time, and the wound was draining
when he left the hospital, and had been cultured and had these two specific organisms
which you have already mentioned in the culture, and he had already been taken back in for
a re-amputation because his previous wound,
apparently, was not infected and would not
heal, I would have very serious doubts whether
the wound would ever heal or not. I don't know.
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I couldn't say that it would heal in six months
or six years, or ever.
From the above evidence which can be the only
basis for the Court's instruction, the court has created
an instruction which bars plaintiff from recovery on
hearsav information of an assumption which is not defined by Dr. Goon and could not be pursued by testimony from Dr. Goon as to what he thought about the
effect of smoking and drinking coffee in relationship
to plaintiff's condition, and more important if the
smoking arnl llrinking coffee could excuse Willard ConYalescent Home from giving plaintiff proper treatment. The Court apparently picked up the statement of
DI. Xixon and in effect made it the controlling issue
ot' the law suit.
Counsel has searched in vam to find cases which
support an instruction that smoking cigarettes and
drinking coffee will bar a person from recovery in a
personal injury action. Counsel finds cases on attempts
to sue manufacturers for the effects of smoking cig(lrettes and the manufacturer's liability for producing
cigarettes, etc., but counsel found no cases '"here a per'>011

was barred from recovery in a personal injury case

because he failed to quit smoking or drinking coffee.
The instruction is particularly damaging to the
plaintiff in that the record showed that plaintiff con-
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tinued to smoke and drink coffee 'vhile in the 'Villard
Convalescent Home. Because of the wording of the instruction, the jury is not entitled to take into consideration the fact that plaintiff healed previous to his stay
in the '\Villard Convalsecnet Home and that he healed
subsequent to the time he was in the \Villard Convalescent Home all the while continuing smoking and drink·
ing coffee. By naming specific acts which the record
already indicates plaintiff was doing, there is nothing
left for the jury to determine except that he was doing
the acts and was, therefore, contributorily negligent.
The court made the determination of what constitutes
contributory negilegence and not the jury. The jury is
left only with the decision of whether or not the plain·
tiff did the things the Court instructed them was contributory negligence.
If the instruction is carried to its logical conclusion,
then every person ·who smokes and drinks coffee is
contributorily negligent and cannot recover in any type
of case. The instruction in its present form gives the
vVillard Convalsecent Home an absolute defense and
completely discounts any acts of negligence in treat·
ing plaintiff on their part. There is absolutely no testi·
mony to show that the bed sores or the infection in
plaintiff's stumps were causalJy and proximately con·
nected to smoking and drinking coffee and yet the whole
case turns on this instruction of the Court.
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The ease was originally brought to determine
1rlicther or not there was negligence in plaintiff's care
treatment at the "Tillard Convalescent Home and
use of the ahcffe instruction the issue becomes a quesbrn of whether or not plaintiff smokes and drinks coffee arnl lies on his side. The jury does not have to conc;j(ler any other factors and the testimony which went
into the ease beeause once they have found that plaintiff smokes an<l drinks coffee and doesn't Jie on his
si:le. the case is oYer because plaintiff is barred from re-

The determination of what factors constitute contriinitory negligence are within the realm of the juries'
fact finding mission and plaintiff submits that such determination was usurped from them by the Court.
Plaintiff submits that the above instruction is prejudicial to plaintiff and is reversible error on the part of the
Court.

POIXT II. THE COFRT ERRED IN NOT
IXTO EYIDENCE DOCUl\IENTS
AS TO
EXPENSE IN THE
ELDHED IIOSPITAL.
In order to show damages, plaintiff, attempted to
present as part of its ease the expenses incurred at the
Eldred Ilospital fo1lowing transfer from the 'Villard
Corl\'ales('ent I-Iome. In order to show the expenses in-

12
curred at the Eldred Hospital, plaintiff called Oscar ,V.
Walch, who was administrator of the Eldred Hospital
from 1958 to 1969. (R-234) l\Ir. \Valch testified as to
the contest over the license of the Eldred Hospital and
the fact that the hospital records for portions of the
Walch
period of plaintiff's stay had been destroyed.
presented in his testimony a summary of the billing as
to plaintiff. It was determined that the billing was not
an original record because. the original records were beyond the statute of limitations and had been destroyed.
( Tr-264) The summary was a statement that was sent
to the plaintiff and the entries on the summary were
made from the original records. ( Tr-266)
Mr. Walch testified that in his opinion the charges
listed were reasonable. ( Tr-269) }fr. Walch further
testified that the summary was an accurate compilation
of other records that were made by himself. ( Tr-280)
The original records were destroyed February or l\1arch,
1971. ( Tr-282) Mr. 'Valch testified that the charges
made by the Eldred Hospital "were within a dollar of
those charges made by other nursing homes m the area."
( Tr-298) The Court refused to allow a summary of the
billing into evidence because: "it does not come within
the shop book exception, in the court's opinion, at this
time." ( Tr-312)
Plaintiff then called lVIr. Seth Billings, President
of Eldred Sunset Manor Foundations Inc., ( Tr-413)
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:rnrl the court summed up the problem as follows:

··\Ye are faced with this situation: original records which have, according to the testimony
that has come in this far, having been handled
in the ordinary course in practice and billed to
the accounts by the accounting staff at Eldred
flospital. Those records have been destroyed
by the hands of the administrator of the hospital, )Ir. "Valch. I-le destroyed them just
sixty days prior to the time when were were to
come into court here. Now this is over a year
and a half after the action began. Under the
exception to the shop book rule, that will permit secondary evidence from the original
entries, the court has got to be satisfied that
that which its going to admit is secondary evidence.
this, by the way, is only a compilation. It's not secondary evidence in the sense
that the Court would do it, but it has got to
be reliable. The court is very concerned about
the fad that the administrator of the hospital
would destroy those original records on which
this whole account is based 60 days before the
trial.
I don't know what you can <lo with
the witness that is going to take you any further around the exception too, or to bring you
within the exception of the shop book rule, and
what an accountant out at the hospital could do.
I can't see it. I am being very frank, Mr.
Lewis." ( Tr-249)
To which counsel responded:
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"He has with him some records. They are
copies of monthly billings made to the county
in the year 1967 and show billings to the county for Curtis Lewis. Now I am not really sure
what the court's problem is? The fact that you
don't have au original record, or that it is not
reliable? You have got this document that Mr.
Billings sent out at the time when they had
their records, and he will testify that they were
compiled from their records." ( Tr-429, 430)
The court ruled that:
"The court's position on this account, Mr.
Lewis, is that I am going to stand on my ruling on the shop book rule that there has not
been sufficient showing to properly qualify
this as an exception to it to allow the secondary
evidence to come in." ( Tr-433)
The court further stated:

"I have a great deal of latitude and discretion,
and I am taking something on myself here, I
suspect, in making this ruling under the shop
rule. I just can't, with this background, with
the county, the fact that the records have been
destroyed sixty days prior to the time of coming here, and I am ruling that the jury will
not hear this evidence on that account." (Tr434)
· Counsel replied:
"So you won't have any evidence before this
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jury that he incurred any obligation at all at
the Eldred, even though the plaintiff has nothing to do with destroying any records?" (Tr434)
To which the Court responded:
"It is a matter of proof, isn't it?" ( Tr-434)

To which counsel responded:
"That it is." (Tr-434)
To which the court replied:
"That is the essential aspect of the ruling."
( Tr-434)
Subsequent to the court ruling, other attempts were
made to put into evidence other records which the court
disallowed which were original records. However the
court ref used to allow plaintiff to reopen the matter.
Plaintiff made the following proffer of proof, which
sums up plaintiff's attempt to prove the charges: (Tr472)
"We offered to prove by l\:Ir. Walch that in
1965, the Eldred Hospital was licensed as a
hospital. And from 1966 through 1969, until
when they terminated operating the hospital,
the denial of their application for a hospital
was being contested by the foundation that
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operated the hospital. And that they were permitted to operate by authority of the Utah
State Board of Health. And during this period
of time they qualified for medicare and received payments from the United States Government through medicare.
They also qualified through the welfare department of Utah County and during this
period of time received payments from Utah
County.
I would also prove through this witness that
the monthly charge made by the Eldred Hospital to :Mr. Lewis for room care from February through l\Iay of 1967 was $330.00 a
month. That the room care to l\Ir. Lewis from
the hospital from June 1967 through September 1968 was $220.00 per month, and that in
addition thereto he was charged for drugs, the
original records which I have here shown from
December, 1967 through September, 1968,
and they are available to introduce into e1·idence. And that the charges from December
1967, through September 1968 have been compared to the charges on plaintiff's exhibit five
and they are the same charges as indicated
thereon. I would further offer to prove that
the ledger sheet, which previously has been
testified to for the charges to be paid by Mr.
Lewis' social security has been unavailable to
be located by this witness, hut that the charge
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would be, for each month he was in there,
$1Gl.68, which is the total of his check,
$106.68 minus $5.00 which was to be paid by
-:\Ir. Lewis out of each social security check received by him.
'Ve also do have some original receipts which
show the payment received by the Eldred facility from i\Ir. Lewis for the social security payments. In addition, I think the record should
show I am offering this as newly discovered
eYi<lence from the time that this witness testified preyiously. And is also offered as rebuttal
testimony, rebutting the testimony that was
presented by Sidney Gilbert when he was called
for the defendant. I would also show to the
court that this witness was in charge of the
records from the Eldred IIospital from the
time he was manager until after the hospital
closed."
I would also show to the Court that this witness was in charge of the records from the
Eldre<l llospital from the time he was manager until after the hospital closed; that he
had a garage full of records which were somewhat similar to the boxes that have been
brought to court todav, there has been no alloeution for any payment for maintaining these,
arnl it was due to an honest statement on his
part that he thought the records had been lost,
that we have here today. and at my request, he
went through the balance of these boxes and

18
found the documents we have produced here
today."
The court denied plaintiff's motion to re-open with
the same ruling as to the proffer of proof. (Tr-474)
The general rule for admissibility of secondary
evidence is stated in Jones on Evidence, fifth edition,
Vol. 1, P. 458, as follows:
"Since the best evidence rule requires proof of
the content of a writing by the writing itself
it must necessarily follow, in order to prevent
miscarriages of justice, that the content of the
writing may be proved by other means where
the ·writing itself is unavailable, or for some
other legitimate reason it is not possible or
feasible to produce it. The situations generalas justifying the failure to proly
duce the original writing and resort to secondary evidence instead, treated separately in the
succeeding sections, are: loss or destruction,
inexpediency of producing public records, and
the like, original in possession of third person5
or out of the reach of the court's jurisdiction,
and failure of adversary to produce original
after notice."
The party seeking to introduce the secondary cYidence must following certain procedures as stated in
.Tones, supra P. 459 as follows:
"Secondary evidence as to the contents of a
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written instrument may be introduced where
proof is made that the writing has been lost or
destroyed. Prior to the introduction of the secondary eYiclence, the proponent must establish
the former existence of the instrument. This
rule has been a pp lied to the proof of lost wills.
There is also authority for the proposition that
due execution of the document must likewise
be shown as a part of the preliminary proof.
But it has been objected that, if such a showing
invokes proof of the contents or tenor of the
document, it is obviously improper.
The correct order of proof is as follows: Existance; execution, loss; contents; but this orJer may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court.
If the loss or destruction of the instrument is
shown to ha\'e been intentional, and for the
purpose of making it una\'ailable at the trial
secondary evidence would be inadmissible."

It is submitted that plaintiff followed all the rt:quirecl steps with its witnesses. First, proof of existence
was shown. Second, execution of the records was shown.
Third, loss of the records was shown by the person who
destroyed the records. Fourth, the contents of the rec,1fds was established along with the procedure for keepthe records. 'Vith the above information the Court
refused to allow the secondary evidence as to what the
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records would have said and expressed concern over
the timing of the destruction of the records.

Jones, supra P. 461 states that:
"If the loss or destruction of the instrument is
shown to have been intentional, and for the pur·
pose of making it unavailable at trial secondary eri·
dence would be inadmissable."
"rigmore on Evidence 3rd ed. 8119 cites Broad'Zi·e/I
v. Stiles, 8 NJ L58 as an extreme case which barred the
secondary evidence upon showing that the destruction
of the original was intentional, without any showing of
fraud. The overwhelming authority does not make in·
tentional destruction a bar unless it is shown to hare
been fraudulent.
In the above case the evidence is clear that
\V alch destroyed the records on the belief that he had
been instructed to do so because the statute of limita·
tions had run. There is no whisper or shred of evidence
to suggest any fraudulent destruction on the part of
plaintiff or at his instigation. The reason for the rule
is to prevent manifest injustices to a party who neeJs
certain documentary evidence for his case but cannot
produce it because someone else destroyed it. That per·
son is then allowed to introduce evidence of a secondar)'
nature. Secondary evidence is discussed in 29 AmJ ur
2d, Evidence, Section 451 as follows:
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"The rule followed by most of the courts of
this c·mmtrv which have passed on the question
is that wh;re primary evidence is not available
and consequently a fact may be proved by secondan· e\·idence, the proponent of the seconis required to produce the best
darv
evidence which exists and which is
in his power to produce. Under this rule, known
as the ''American Rule'\ the secondary evidence which is admissible is the best secondary
evidence obtainable. If it appears that there
is an existence secondary evidence of a more
satisfactory kind than the secondary evidence
which a pa1iy offers, he will be required to
prO!luce the better e\·idence if he can do so;
he will not be permitted to introduce the inferior secondary evidence, offered unless he
can show that the better secondary evidence,
as well as the original primary evidence, is una,·ailable. F n<ler this rule, a copy of a lost writing is the next best evidence, and if it is available, oral e,·idence is inadmissible in relation
thereto; hut if a true copy is unobtainable,
Parol testimony is propertly admissible.
The English courts do not recognize degrees in
secondary evidence, and some American
authorities follow the English rule denying
that there are degrees of legal distinction in
secondary e\·idence. ender this rule, where the
original of a writing has been lost, the copy and
oral tcsti111011!1
to such writing are
both sccondar,l! cl'idence. and both are compe-
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tent evidence in establishing the contents of
the lost writing. Thus, a party may gi,ve oral
testimony of the contents of a lost letter which
is a private writing, even though he may have
a copy in his possession or control." (Emphasis
added)
Defendant submits that the court erred in disallow·
ing secondary evidence which included copies of destroyed documents or summaries prepared from destroyed documents by the very people who kept the
records as part of the normal workings of the Eldred
Hospital.
The purpose of introducing evidence of plaintiff's
account with the hospital was to provide a basis for an
award of damages. 'Vithout evidence of the expenses
incurred, there is no real basis upon which a trier of
fact can determine damages.
The court has effectively precluded plaintiff from
establishing a basis for damages by not allowing into
evidence testimony and exhibits.
From the above information it is apparent that
documents showing the original charges of Eldred Hos·
pital to plaintiff were destroyed and that after a second
search some were found but the Court disallowed any
documentary evidence or oral testimony to show the
charges against plaintiff's account and the expenses in·
curred in the Eldred Hospital.
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Plaintiff submits that he was entitled under the
rules of e,·idence to show the charges of the hospital
and that the ruling of the court is prejudicial to plaintiff and reversible error.

POIN"T III: THE COURT ERRED IN NOT
ALLO\VING T II E OPINION OF OLGA
A REGISTERED NURSE, AS TO A
HYPOTHETIC.AL QUESTION ASKED BY
COUNSEL.
The key issue in the above case was the failure of
the duty of care a patient of a convalescent home is
owed and the failure of the 'Villard Con,ralescent Home
tu discharge its duty toward plaintiff. Plaintiff alleged
::ts specii'ic areas of negligence, the following:
" (I) Failure to turn the plaintiff in bed reg-

ularly, and failure to turn the plaintiff at all.
( 2) Failure to provide plaintiff with a vibrating bed or sheep skin or other protective device
to prevent bed sores. ( 8) Failure to provide a
doctor, and failure to provide proper medication. ( 4) Failure to keep the plaintiff clean,
and failure to keep the plaintiff's bed dry.
( 5) Failure to properly dress and care for
plaiutiff's wound." (R-84)
The plaintiff called as a witness, l\Irs. Olga Smith,
a registered nurse, to testify as to the condition of plaintiff uµon his arriYal at the Eldred Center and was asked
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hypothetical question based on her nursing experience
and expertise as follows :

3.

"I want you to assume that you had received
Curtis Lewis as a patient on or about the
24th day of September, 1966, and at that time
he had had his leg amputated, as you saw him
when you first saw him at your hospital, but
that he had had two amputations to the left
stump. One was in June of 1966, and thereafter, after that amputation he developed
some additional gangrene of an area about 2
by 4 inches, and thereafter, on October 20,
1966, there was a second amputation where the
would was closed and two rubber drains were
inserted.
Approximately 25 days thereafter the stitches
had been removed, the drains had been removed, and he was healed, except for an area
where one of the drains had its exit, and at that
area there was a small amount of drainage
and the culture taken from the drainage indicated that there was strep and staph present.
Now you had received this patient, Curtis
Lewis, on that date and in this condition and
under his state of health, that is, he had arterial
sclerosis and that was the reason for the amputations, that the prescription written by the
doctor, the treatment of the doctor to follow
up with Mr. Lewis in his condition for mysteclin-1'\ full strength and Phenaphen No. 3. Do
you have an opinion as to how long with
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proper treatment it would have taken you to
heal this stump.
Smith did have an opinion as to how long the
matter woul<l have taken to heal, however, she was not
allowed by the court to give this opinion.
Counsel argued that because Mrs. Smith was a
registered nurse by her formal training and her experience and nursing is something completely within her
field and because she knew the particular patient and
knows how he reacted under her treatment and knows
the effect of his healing under the situation he is in
that she was entitled to state an opinion based on her
expertise as to how long it would have taken.
The Court ruled that because the witness does not
p!·escribe and does not have knowledge in the particular
area of drugs used in the treatment and does not have
tllf schooling to know the effect of drugs on an individual, particularly this individual, that her opinion would
be speculative and may tend to bring in other techniques
may know of in her callings. ()12)
Counsel argued that an expert's opinion is always
m the realm of some speculation, however, it is germane to this law suit that we have a witness who is
skilled and qualified in the nursing profession and the
la"' suit in its essence, involved a nursing question. The
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court could instruct that this was the opinion of :\Irs.
Smith and they could give it what weight they think it
was entitle<l to. "VR-132)
Plaintiff submits that the issue of the case involved
the ca1·e and treatment of plaintiff in the 'Villard Con,·alescent Home. The witness was a qualified nurse
an<l was asked a nursing question. The court ruled that
since she does not prescribe drugs (which is to say she is
not a doctor) and does not know the effect of drugs on
an individual, her testimony would be speculative. However, plaintiff submits that her testimony would haYe
weight because she is a qualified nurse and the court
instruct as to the opinion of an expert. The court
based its ruling not on the qualifications of a nurse being an expert witness but on the testimony being speculative v:hich again usurps the function of a jury.
Jones on Evidence, supra, P. 823 classes nurses as
expert witnesses by saying:
"In accordance with the principle herein considered, the courts will receive the testimony of
such experts as lawyers, physicians, nurses,
artists, and authors, as well as persons in other
walks of life. But as to the value of professional services, only persons engaged in that
profession may express opinions. The witness's
testimony is not conclusive upon the jury or
upon a court sitting without a jury; it is merely
advising."
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Since the business of the '¥'illard Convalescent
IJ01i.e is to JH'OYi<le nursing care, the standard of care
required shoul(l be determined by experts in the nursing
field. There was no objection as to l\Irs. Smith being
qt:alified as a registered nurse and it was established
that she had long experience. There was no objection
to the asking of the hypothetical question. It \Vas after
the c1uestiou had been asked that objection was made
ancl the witness was examined as to her knowledge of
(lrugs. Thereafter. the court ruled that her testimony
would he speculative. There was no element of the
r:iuestion omitted and the witness had an opinion. Plaintiff submits that the witness was entitled to give her
opinion and that as an expert in nursing the question
was well taken and proper.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff submits that he is entitled to recover for
in.iuries caused him by the negligence of the \Villard
Com·alescent Home in treating him for a four month
pe!·iod in
he <leYeloped bed sores and infection in
stump. Because of rulings of the Court plaintiff
was not allowed to prove his expenses at the Eldred
Hospital which effecti,'ely precludes the jury from determining damages for injury. Plaintiff was further
prejudiced when l\I rs. Smith, a registered nurse was
to answer a hypothetical question which was
not
properly asked to an expert witness on nursing. l\Iost
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damaging to plaintiff's case was the instruction of the
Court on contributory negligence. Plaintiff submits
that there was no basis for such an instruction either
based on evidence or based on law. Plaintiff prays that
the court remand the case to the lower court for a new
trial with instructions as to contributory negligence,
proof of damages, and the opinion of a nurse on nursing
questions.
Respectfully submitted,

S. Rex Lewis, for:
HOWARD ANJ) LEWIS
Attorneys for Plaintiff
120 East 300 North

Provo, Utah 84601

